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NOTES AND COMMENT
CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS-RIGHT OF TENANT TO COMPENSA-
TION FOR FIXTURES ANNEXED TO CONDEMNED LAND.
What fixtures annexed by the tenant pass with the land as inci-
dent thereto is an important question to be determined in condemna-
tion proceedings.' Chattels which as a matter of law retain the
character of movables 2 remain personalty despite any agreement.
Brick, stone, and plaster,3 which become so merged with the land
that they lose their identity, are realty notwithstanding an agreement
to the contrary; third, those 4 so affixed that they may be either
personalty or realty depending upon the relation or agreement of the
parties. The discussion will be confined to the third class.
Upon this subject the authorities are apparently in conflict. By
some decisions, articles annexed to the land and removable by the
tenant, are regarded as personalty. 5 Others hold that they are fix-
tures and constitute part of the land until actually removed. 6 The
latter appears to be the sounder view. By so considering the annexed
articles, it seems only possible to justify the rule that a tenant loses
the right to remove them by failing to do so during his term 7 or
possession,8 as a tenant does not forfeit the right to chattels left on
the premises after expiration of lease; 9 neither could the right to
them be lost by the taking of a new lease.' 0
1 Matter of the City of New York, 118 App. Div. 865, 103 N. Y. Supp. 908
(lst Dept. 1907), aff'd, 189 N. Y. 508, 81 N. E. 1162 (1907) ; Jackson v. State
of New York, 213 N. Y. 34, 106 N. E. 758 (1914). In re Matter of the
Mayor, etc., 39 App. Div. 589, 55 N. Y. Supp. 165 (1st Dept. 1899).
' Central Union Gas Co. v. Browning, 210 N. Y. 10, 103 N. E. 822 (1913);
Cosgrove v. Troescher, 62 App. Div. 123, 70 N. Y. Supp. 764 (1st Dept. 1901).
'Voorhees v. McGuinnis, 48 N. Y. 278 (1872).
'Holt v. Henley, 232 U. S. 637, 34 Sup. Ct. 459 (1914) ; Ford v. Cobb,
20 N. Y. 344 (1859); Tifft v. Horton, 53 N. Y. 377 (1873); Herzog v. Marx,
202 N. Y. 1, 94 N. E. 1063 (1911) ; DeBevoise v. Maple Ave. Construction Co.,
228 N. Y. 496, 127 N. E. 487 (1920).
'Globe Marble Mills Co. v. Quinn, 76 N. Y. 23 (1879); Conde v. Lee, 55
App. Div. 401, 67 N. Y. Supp. 157 (4th Dept. 1900).
'Freeman v. Dawson, 110 U. S. 264, 4 Sup. Ct. 94 (1884); Carlin v.
Ritter, 68 Md. 478, 16 Atl. 301 (1888) ; In re Matter of City of Buffalo, 17
N. Y. St. Rep. 371, 1 N. Y. Supp. 763 (1888). "The test in each is what is the
character of the property of the tenant, although never to be removed, but such
ownership does not make it personal property, although the right to removal
may be exercised."
TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1st ed. 1912) §240 (a), "The logical
ground on which the right of removal seems to be based is in favor of trade
and to encourage industry. If it exists on the presumption of the tenant to
subsequently remove the articles, there appears no more reason for such pre-
sumption not to apply to fixtures other than trade."
'Loughran v. Ross, 45 N. Y. 792 (1869).
l Ibid.
'Supra note 2.
10 Supra note 2.
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In a receint case,"' the claimant, a tenant, leased the premises
condemned as a meat market. Trade fixtures were affixed with the
privilege of removal retained by the lessee. There was also a pro-
vision that the terms of the agreement were to be inoperative upon
the taking of the property by public authorities. In this instance,
property was appropriated a few months before the expiration of the
lease. The Appellate Division decreed the rule which obtained
between vendor and vendee applied; hence, the trade fixtures are
real property according to the statute ' 2 and must be included within
the award. Upon the appeal, the opinion was affirmed.
This decision is upheld by the law declared in a former case
analogous in facts.' 3 It is true that the fixtures assessed in other
cases 14 were annexed to a structure built by the tenant for the pur-
pose of trade. But, does it follow because the fixtures, which were
peculiarly adapted to a trade conducted by the tenant, and annexed to
the premises owned by the lessor, became personalty?
It is a settled rule of law that the lessor, with the consent of the
lessee, may convey by deed a perfect title of the entire interest in the
land including that of the tenant.' 5 Between owner and the city, the
rule of law which obtains between vendor and vendee is applicable.' 6
The courts have not rigidly enforced this rule in the landlord and
tenant relationship; 17 on the contrary, they have modified it to
encourage trade.
In Van Ness v. Placard,'8 Story, J. enunciated: "The general
rule of the common law is that whatever is once annexed to the free-
hold becomes part of it and cannot be afterwards removed, except by
him who is entitled to the inheritance. This rule, however, was never
inflexible and without exception. It was construed * * * more liber-
ally between landlord and tenant. The more extensive exception to
the rule has been of fixtures for the purposes of trade."
Observing the case from this viewpoint, notice In re Matter of
the City of New York (North River waterfront).19 The tenant
erected d building and installed machinery for furtherance of trade.
There was an option in the lease for the renewal of the term or the
purchase of the property by the lessor. The city rejected the machin-
ery as personal property. In an action to recover their value as
'Ii re Matter of City of New York (Allen St.), 256 N. Y. 236, 176
N. E. 377 (1931).
'The Greater New York Charter §969 (4).
'In re Matter of the Application of the City of New York, 192 N. Y. 295,
84 N. E. 1105 (1908).
" Schuchairdt v. Mayor, etc., 53 N. Y. 202 (1873); Matter of City of
New York (Avenue A), 66 Misc. 488, 122 N. Y. Supp. 321 (1910); Matter of
City of New York (Rockaway Blvd.), 201 App. Div. 862 (2d. Dept. 1924);
Matter of Willcox, 142 App. Div. 680, 125 N. Y. Supp. 594 (1st Dept. 1911).
"Mott v. Palmer, 1 N. Y. 564 (1848).
" Supra note 14.
"'Andrews v. Day Button Co., 132 N. Y. 348, 30 N. E. 831 (1892).
"2 Pet. 137 (U. S. 1829).
"Supra note 1.
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realty, held, such fixtures are real property. The judge remarked:
"Assuming that if the landlord elected to purchase a building under
the provision of the lease, it would not be required to pay for such
property and the tenant be required to remove it; when the city con-
demns a property, it takes from the tenant the building of which this
machinery is a part and it is only just that the tenant should be paid
what the building as a whole is worth. What the tenant is entitled
to is a fair market value of the property taken." 20
The city does not receive an assignment of the landlord's rights ;21
it is a stranger to the agreement between landlord and tenant and
places the lessee in the position of buyer towards seller, without his
consent.
22
Upon the vesting of the city's title, the lease ends notwithstand-
ing an agreement to the contrary.2 3 In assessing damages, the com-
missioner must first ascertain the value of the fee as if owned by one
person, and then apportion that amount between or among all the
estates and interests which such persons have in the property.24 The
value of the leasehold is included.2 5 Where the lease expired, the
claimant could not recover as he had no interest in the premises.26
Under the term, he had enjoyed all to which he was entitled; but, in
the instant case,27 the leasehold was prematurely ended by the action
of a paramount power. Between landlord and tenant only, it ceased
to exist. By the provision terminating the lease, the tenant is
deprived of an award for the remainder of the term which he other-
wise would have had.
2 8
The law does not leave the title to the appropriated land in sus-
pense.29 All rights and interests of the owner or owners in the res
are extinguished and immediately vest in the city upon the notice of
In re Bellevue Hospital Psychopathic Pavilion Site, 130 Misc. 774, 230
N. Y. Supp. 411 (1928).
' Matter of City of New York, mpra note 1 at 868, N. Y. Supp. at 910.
"The City is not the landlord and as against the tenant has not acquired the
landlord's rights, but is taking this property against the wish of both the
landlord and tenant."
'Jackson v. State of New York, supra note 1 at 35. "Power of the State
is not so great, nor the plight of the citizen so helpless! Condemnation is an
enforced sale and the State stands toward owner as buyer toward seller. On
that basis the rights and duties of each must be determined." See also
1 NICHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN (2d ed. 1917).
m'Matter of City of New York (Delancey St.) 120 App. Div. 700, 105
N. Y. Supp. 779 (1st Dept. 1907); In re Block Bounded by Avenue A, supra
notes 14 and 19; 2 LEwis, EMINENT DoMAIN (3d ed. 1909) §719.
'Matter of Daly, 29 App. Div. 286, 287, 51 N. Y. Supp. 576 (1st Dept.
1898) ; Matter of City of New York, supra note 1; In re Matter of City of
Buffalo, supra note 6.
Supra note 24.
Matter of Daly, supra note 24.
='Supra note 11.
' Supra note 24.
'Jackson v. State of New York, supra note 1 at 36.
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appropriation proceedings. 30 Although trade fixtures are removable
without substantial injury to the freehold, they are part of the land.31
The city in availing itself of the right of eminent domain cannot reject
them; it must pay for what it takes and not what it gets, 32 and the
tenant is not obliged to remove them any more than he would the
building if he were the owner.
The confusion in cases of this nature results from calling prop-
erty real,33 personalty. The common-law rule has not been changed. 34
Apparently the erroneous conception arose because of the courts,
without discussion on the question, calling trade fixtures personal
property, 35 thinking this necessarily follows because they are remov-
able; or, although annexed to be part of the land, they will eventually
become p'ersonalty by the exercise of the right of removal. Conced-
ing that trade fixtures while annexed are personalty, as between land-
lord and tenant, nevertheless, the tenant would forfeit them by the
failure to remove same during the terA of his possession.36 Again,
there would be a transmutation of property from personalty to realty
without any change in annexation.3 7 The foregoing illustrations point
out the illogical rule and the consequent difficulties. The sounder
view would be that of other jurisdictions 30-that trade fixtures
while annexed are a part of the land until removed. This is logical
and consistent with the rule invoked between city and tenant. If
there is a transfer of such fixtures, they themselves are not trans-
'Jackson v. State of New York, supra note 1 at 36; In re Matter of City
of Buffalo, supra note 6 at 376.
' Supra note 6.
'
21n re Matter of City of Buffalo, supra note 6 at 376. "As the fixtures
now exist, they are real property, and so remain until severed from the build-ing. This act the tenant is not bound to perform at the time the property is
taken." Supra note 19.
Supra note 6.
* In Omboy v. Jones, 19 N. Y. 234, 240 (1859) judge Comstock declared:
"The general maxim of the law is that whatever is fixed to the realty becomes
part of it, and partakes of all its incidents and properties. This is the rule even
in the relation of landlord and tenant. Many exceptions have been engrafted
,upon it, but the rule itself has not been lost sight of." See also TYLER, Fix-
TURES (1877).
Talbot v. Cruger, 151 N. Y. 117, 120, 45 N. E. 364 (1896) : "The right of
a tenant to remove fixtures erected for trade is conceded to him for reasons of
public policy and being in the nature of a privilege, it must be exercised before
the expiration of the term or before he quits possession."
Globe Marble Mills Co. v. Quinn, supra note 5.
' Supra note 7.
(Tenant had title to the fixtures. Before annexation they were per-
sonalty but after affixation became realty or part of the land.) In Riley v.
Boston Water Power Co., 11 Cush. 11 (Mass. 1853), the judge, referring
to standing trees and soil severed from the land, enumerated: "They cease to be
real estate and become personalty. But the transmutation, while it changes the*
character of the property in this respect, does not change its ownership. It is
actual severance that changes the property from real to personal." (Italics
ours.)
'Sampson v. Camperdown Cotton Mills, 64 Fed. 939 (C. C. S. C. 1894);
Freeman v. Dawson, mtpra note 6.
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ferred but rather the right to remove them is.39 Since the right to
remove was lost by the act of the city, the tenant must be compen-
sated for the interest he would otherwise have had.40
Although the tenant is legally and equitably entitled to compen-
sation, a disregard of the distinction between personal and real prop-
erty would simplify and clarify the problem. Why not regard all
condemned property as merely property and not as personalty or
realty? Why not settle all disputes in such matters on principles of
equity and justice unhampered by such classification and thus remove
uncertainty, confusion, and conflict?
PHILIP A. LIMPERT.
ENFORCEMENT OF AFFIRMATIVE COVENANTS IN PERSONAL SERVICE
CONTRACTS BY PROHIBITORY INJUNCTION.
Decisions on pleas for injunctions to specifically enforce con-
tracts of personal services are excellent examples of the discretionary
power of a court of equity. When these services are unique, special
or extraordinary on the part of the defendant, it is plain that the
principle on which equity's jurisdiction rests is the same as that
which applies to agreements for the purchase of lands, or of chattels
having a unique character and value. The damages for the breach
of such contracts cannot be estimated with any degree of certainty,
and the employer cannot, by means of any compensation, purchase
the same services in the labor market.' But at first equity refused
to enforce any contracts, irrespective of the inadequacy of damages,
if they involved a continuing breach. The courts took the position
that contracts which required varied and continuous acts would not
be specifically enforced, because a decree in such cases would entail a
continuous supervision, by the officers of the court, of the acts done
by the defendant pursuant to the decree.2  Gradually, however, the
So. Baltimore Co. v. Muhlbach, 69 Md. 395, 16 Atl. 117 (1888); (sale
of buildings erected by tenant is not an interest in land; not within Stat. of
Frauds).
'In re Matter of Buffalo, supra note 6 at 376: "The City loses nothing; it
simply forces the tenant to sell and steps into place and when it has extin-
guished both titles it has nothing but land, such property as the statute conterm-
plates shall be taken."
'POM ROY, SPECIFIc PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1926) §24.
'Beck v. Allison, 56 N. Y. 366 (1874) ; Standard Fashion Co. v. Siegel-
Cooper, 157 N. Y. 60, 51 N. E. 408 (1898). POMEROY, supra note 1. §22: "As
a general proposition, contracts which provide for the personal affirmative acts,
or the personal services of the parties, are not specifically enforced in equity,
not because the legal remedy of damages is always sufficiently certain and
adequate, but because the courts do not possess the means and ability of
enforcing their decrees, which would necessarily be very special, and of com-
pelling the performance which constitutes the equitable remedy."
